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Divergent Discourses, Children and Forced 
Migration 
 
Giorgia Doná and Angela Veale 
 
Abstract 
 
Experiences of refugee, internally displaced and migrant children in different contexts (such as 
post-conflict and resettlement) are often considered separately, yet closer analysis points to the 
existence of commonalities across transnational locations and a need to articulate the ways in 
which global systems, state policies and migration processes impact on the lives of these 
children. Current discourses, policies and practices towards forced migrant children show that 
there are divergent and at times conflicting constructions of childhood and migration, and 
implicitly reveal the positions that these children occupy in relation to the nation-state system. In 
this article we focus on the existence of common divergent discourses that emerge from contexts 
in the global North and South, including Rwanda, Uganda, Ireland and the United Kingdom, 
where we have carried out research with children forced to move. Our overall aim is to re-
politicise the position of child and youth forced migration through an analysis of three sets of 
divergent or ambivalent discourses: a) forced-migrant children as product of and threat to the 
nation-state; b) ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ children; and c) the ‘psychological’ and the ‘political’ child. 
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Introduction 
Forced displacement is both a threat to, and a product of, the international system of nation-states. It 
therefore exposes fundamental inconsistencies in the ideology that underlies the nation-state system 
(Turton 2002: 20). 
 
Turton’s analysis of the relationship between forced migration and the nation-state system 
positions forced migrants at the intersection of displacement, migration, national belonging and 
citizenship. Forced migrants are obliged to flee because they do not fit within nation-state 
projects but they can only move to another nationstate, and not outside the international system 
of nation-states. Turton refers to forced migrants in general. In the last few years, there have 
been increased concerns about children displaced by conflict and forced to flee*either internally 
or across borders*to become asylum-seekers and refugees. 
Most researchers who analyse childhood and forced migration do so in the context of one 
specific country (i.e. Christie 2003; Christie and Sidhu 2006; Giner 2007; Lane and Tribe 2006; 
Spicer 2008). While there is a growing body of literature that discusses the challenges faced by 
forced-migrant children in the context of Europe and the UK, it is rare for such work to interact 
with the experiences from the global South, where children are displaced in large numbers 
(Boyden and Hart 2007). 
 
A useful approach is to explore examples that point to transnational commonalities in the ways in 
which forced-migrant children are represented. Furthermore, forced-migrant children’s 
experiences are generally represented through the prism of psychology and mental health 
(Ahearn et al. 1999; Dona´ 2006; Hodes 2002; Loughry and Eyber 2003; Summerfield 2000; 
Thomas and Lau 2002). A key motivational concern in this literature is a child protection agenda 
and the development of effective psychosocial and mental-health interventions. However an 
intended or unintended outcome of positioning forced-migrant children as beneficiaries of 
humanitarian assistance and needs-based social-care programmes is that it places their 
experiences outside political discourse. This coincides with reported real-life experiences of 
forced-migrant children*such as those in the UK* who are pressured into de-politicising their 
experiences, once they become applicants in the asylum process, by appearing sufficiently 
‘victim-like’ and not too ‘political’ and by downplaying their own political engagement (Crawley 
2007; Crawley, this issue). 
 
While recognising the important contribution which the literature from a child protection 
perspective has made to our understanding of the impact of forced migration on children’s lives, 
our aim here is to re-politicise child forced migration. We use the term ‘forced-migrant’ child to 
refer to children who have fled violence in general, independent of whether they are inside the 
country (internally displaced), have crossed an international border (refugees or asylum-
seekers), or have returned to the country of origin (returnees). We take Boyden and Hart’s (2007) 
call for a greater interaction across different bodies of literature and attempt to expand it through 
a comparative analysis of migration and childhood that draws attention to the position that 
forced-migrant children occupy within the system of nation-states. Turton (2002: 22) writes that 
the nation-state concept is a fusion of two assumed entities: that of a nation as a ‘homogenous 
cultural community’ with common interests, and that of a state as a geopolitical entity, with its 
bureaucratic and administrative apparatus and political structures that govern the territory, laws 
about who may enter and leave that territory and conditions of rights to remain. In reality, he 
points out that many nation-states do not demonstrate this ideal and are more accurately 
conceptualised as ‘multi-nation states’ as a result of the co-existence of more than one cultural or 
ethnic group that belong within the geopolitical state entity. Yet the nation-state concept is 
predicated on an acceptance of the assumption of this ideal: that the state as territory and 
political apparatus overlaps with the nation as a community of belonging, and equal citizenship 
for its members. He points out that the nation-state system has been immensely successful at 
one level as it has enabled the movement of the citizens of one nation-state to another to be 
politically administered in an efficient and predictable manner. 
 
Forced migration, however, exposes inconsistencies in the way in which the international system 
of nation-states functions. For example, many recent conflicts have occurred in situations in 
which national or ethnic identity has become mobilised as a marker of ‘belonging’ to the nation-
state and those who do not ‘fit’ or become ‘other’ or ‘not like us’ may be stripped of their rights as 
equal citizens. The victims of conflict become constructed as a risk or threat to the ‘ideal match’ 
between the nation and the state, and may experience displacement or even expulsion (as in 
Rwanda, Eritrea or Bosnia for example). In such cases, forced migrants can only flee to another 
nation-state*and not outside the system of nation-states*therefore presenting a challenge for the 
‘ideal match’ in other nation-states. As such, forced migration is frequently the product of nation-
state building or maintenance, while simultaneously posing a threat to the nation-state and, 
through their cross-border movement, to the nation-state system. Internally displaced individuals, 
too, highlight an inconsistency in the nation-state system whereby forcibly uprooted minorities 
are positioned as marginalised in terms of ‘equal’ claims to citizenship. 
 
Children tend to be subsumed as a social category in considerations of the relationship between 
the nation-state system, citizenship and belonging. In this article we explore three sets of 
divergent or ambivalent discourses: a) forced-migrant children as a product of and as a threat to 
the nation-state system b) visible and invisible children and c) the psychological and the political 
child. We argue that children who are displaced by violence, live in post-conflict contexts or seek 
asylum, share commonalities in their position with respect to individual nation-states as well as in 
relation to the global system of which these nation-states are part. These divergent discourses 
expose fundamental gaps, tensions and inconsistencies in the ideology of the nation-state 
system per se.  
 
Re-Politicising Child Forced Migration: An Exploration of Divergent Discourses 
 
Discourse is language as a system of representation, a meaning-making activity that constructs 
the topic and functions as social action. ‘To enter into the study of discourse, therefore, is to 
enter into debates about the foundations on which knowledge is built, subjectivity is constructed 
and society is managed’ (Wetherall et al. 2001: 5). We analyse a combination of such discourses 
produced within legal and political environments to show that there are similarities in forced-
migrant children’s position within the nation-state system, and to argue for their re-politicisation. 
Our awareness of the need to re-politicise the experiences of displaced and forced migrant 
children stems from Rwanda, where we realised*for many years after the 1994 genocide*how 
apparently-apolitical psychological interventions for children functioned in a political space (Veale 
and Dona´ 2002). We noted how many policies and programmes with displaced and war-affected 
children were couched in politically neutral child-protection language while simultaneously, in 
practice, children were identified as ‘vulnerable’ and in need of protection with reference to post-
genocide discourses that assumed the existence of differential claims to ‘equal citizenship’. 
 
We observed that, in post-genocide Rwanda*a country signatory to the 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child*child survivors of the genocide received support while the children of those 
accused of involvement in the genocide received none, even though Rwandan children 
themselves identified children of families accused of acts of genocide as even more vulnerable 
than genocide orphans, as they were isolated, many in child-headed families, and had the 
responsibility of bringing food to the parent in prison (Veale et al. 2001). A post-genocide nation-
state discourse of unity and reconciliation*‘We are all Rwandans’*according to which each child 
was to be viewed as a child of the nation-state, coexisted with politics of ‘genocide victimhood’ 
that positioned some categories of children as less-deserving ‘others’ in the national project of 
nation-state redefinition. In our subsequent fieldwork in the different contexts where we 
worked*Uganda, Ireland and the UK* we became aware of the existence of divergent discourses 
about childhood and nation-state maintenance that presented similar tensions. While single-
country studies might allow fully contextualised and detailed accounts of the experiences of 
forced-migrant children, they fail to highlight the connections and parallels across different states 
where these children find themselves. We adopt a multi-country approach in order to shift the 
focus from a predominant analysis of childhood and asylum to the geo-politics of childhood and 
forced migration. We selected these countries based on our experience of working there. These 
countries are also interesting because of their different geo-political positions in the North and the 
South, their migratory histories as sending and receiving countries, and the different phases they 
represent in the formation and maintenance of their nation-state ideologies. 
 
The 1994 genocide created a rupture in Rwanda’s national history, still in the process of 
redefinition and reconstruction. The formation in July 1994 of the new Government of National 
Unity under the influence of key figures within the Rwandan refugees’ diasporic community who 
returned after 1994 is an example of a country in the process of recreating its national identity in 
which the genocide and its legacy play a central role, and where ethnicities have been legally 
banned under the national slogan ‘We are all Rwandans’. Uganda’s post-colonial history of 
nationbuilding is more consolidated than that of Rwanda, but continuous political tensions 
between the central Government and the north of the country, with its recent history of conflict by 
the Lord’s Resistance Army, show how different agendas of belonging within the nation-state are 
still contested, and how forced mobility is played out within these struggles of peace negotiations 
and reconstruction. Rwanda and Uganda are positioned within global migration in the role of 
sending countries. The outmigration flux reaches not only neighbouring regions but also the 
borders of Western countries in North America, Australia and Europe. Here, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, among others, occupy the position of receiving countries of forcedmigrants’ 
movements. 
 
Ireland’s history has been traditionally characterised by out-migration, and it was only in the last 
two decades of economic boom that the Irish state was confronted with the new phenomenon of 
the in-migration of East Europeans and forced migrants from the global South. Ireland’s recent 
history of migration challenges what it means to belong and it struggles to re-imagine itself as a 
host country to people arriving around from the world. The UK has a longer history of 
engagement with issues of migration and multiculturalism. Its past history of Empire and 
Commonwealth memberships means that there have been tensions between what it means to be 
British and to belong for some time. 
 
Forced Migrant Children: Product and Threat  
 
Turton (2002) writes that forced migration is both the product of and a threat to the system of 
nation-states. This is due to the imperfect overlap between the ‘nation’, intended as a community 
of belonging, and the ‘state’ as its legal, political and administrative apparatus. Forced migrants 
are often a product of the nation-state system because the formation or reformation of nation-
states may be accompanied by the expulsion of those deemed not to fit within the nation-state 
project. Forced migrants are also a threat to nation-states because, when expelled by one 
nation-state, they can only ask for asylum in another and, in so doing, threaten the existing 
match between nation and state, as do national minorities. 
 
Boyden and Hart (2007) write that asylum-seeker and refugee children tend to be seen as either 
victims or threatening individuals. As victims they are perceived to be innocent and in need of 
help while, as threat, they are to be controlled or re-educated. Thus, adapting Turton’s (2002) 
statement, forced-migrant children are both the ‘product’ of and a ‘threat’ to the nation-state 
system. As product, they are victims in need of help while, as threat, they are criminalised as 
undeserving of those rights belonging to citizens. 
 
The Rwandan case shows the complex dynamics between discourses of childhood as product 
and those as threat in the context of a nation-state in crisis. For the Parme-Hutu genocidal 
regime in pre-genocide Rwanda, children of Tutsi descent were considered a threat to the nation-
state project that was based on a racist Hutu ideology of ‘ethnic purity’. They were called 
‘cockroaches’ and ‘small rats’, and targeted for extermination. Those few Tutsi children who 
managed to survive the genocide were called ‘rescapees’ and, as such, became constructed as 
the product of the racist Hutu ideology and its victims. In post-genocide Rwanda, rescapee 
children became central to the self-definition of the new Tutsi-dominated state as a victimised 
nation and other categories of children came to be perceived as a threat to the formation of this 
new nation-state. This included children accused of involvement in the genocide, the children of 
genocidaires and street and forced-migrant children living in Eastern Congo. Our work on street-
life involvement in Rwanda showed that most youth living on the street were doing so because of 
political violence (Veale and Dona´ 2003). These Rwandan youth did not easily fit within the post-
genocide nation-state project; they were perceived as a ‘threat’ to order and unity, and were 
regularly picked up from the streets and sent to be re-educated in secluded areas. 
 
Children who have been formerly abducted or conscripted into the armed forces constitute an 
additional example of the tension between discourses of forcibly moved children as a product of 
and as a threat to the nation-state system. In Uganda, former child-soldier abductees reported 
that they were welcomed back, as people saw that they were victims who had been taken 
against their will; however, if they got angry or aggressive for any reason, they experienced a 
shift from being identified as a friend or peer to identification as a ‘rebel’ (Veale and Stavrou 
2007). In international discourse, and increasingly within international law, former child soldiers 
are considered primarily as victims of conflict (Coˆ te´ 2005: 4). Yet there is significant 
dissonance between this discourse of victimhood evident at an international level, and 
discourses within national-level systems in the global North when former child soldiers apply for 
refugee status and are perceived as a threat. There are concerns that former child soldiers, 
including those from northern Uganda, have been excluded from refugee status in the UK by the 
application of Article 1Fa of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, by which 
‘states are obliged to refuse refugee status to any persons ‘‘with respect to whom there are 
serious reasons for considering that . . . he has committed a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity’’’ (Happold 2002: 1133).  
 
Adolescent forced migrants are also caught up in such tension. As a product of political violence, 
they are primarily treated as children and victims and, if unaccompanied, are offered protection 
under the UK 1989 Children’s Act rather than the 2004 Asylum and Immigration Act. However, in 
age disputes, in Ireland and in the United Kingdom, youth aged 16!18 years who do not fit the 
dominant view of ‘children’ may find themselves in a disadvantageous position when claiming 
asylum (Crawley 2007). When their ages are disputed, in age assessment interviews, the burden 
of proof is on young people to prove that they are under the age of 18. In the UK, in some cases, 
children whose ages are disputed are detained in Young Offenders’ Institutes and some in adult 
prisons on arrival. Increasing numbers of asylumseeking children are placed in detention. In the 
UK, in 2004, around 2,000 children   were being held in detention centres for periods that ranged 
between 7 and 268 days (Crawley and Lester 2005: viii). In September 2008, lawyers challenged 
the legality of detention for children when they took the case of an eight-year-old boy*detained in 
an immigration removal centre since July*to the High Court (BBC Radio 4, 2008). Detention 
criminalises children*whether unaccompanied or as members of the family unit*as the 
‘threatening other’ (or the new generation of hordes of threatening ‘others’) who is to be confined 
or re-educated. The deportation of children and families whose asylum claim has been rejected 
is also predicated on the 
view that these children are the ‘other’ who ‘threaten’ national belonging, and are to 
be expelled. 
In recent years Ireland, for instance, has introduced a number of containment measures to stem 
an in-flow of asylum-seekers that is perceived to be threatening ‘Irish national identity’. One such 
measure is the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Bill (2004), which effectively removed the 
entitlement to citizenship in respect of a person born in Ireland to non-national parents. This 
change was approved by 80 per cent of the population in a citizenship referendum. A non-
national child will only be given citizenship if one of the parents has been lawfully resident in the 
country for three of the four years before the birth. This changed the nature of ‘belonging’ from 
citizenship that was defined by territory*jus soli*whereby citizenship was conferred on all children 
born on the territory of the nation, to jus sanguinis, or the law of blood, under which citizenship is 
inherited. Two babies born on the same day in the same hospital in Cork or Dublin may now 
differ in one very significant respect*one may be accorded the full rights of citizenship, while the 
other is denied this basic status of belonging. 
 
In 2005, the Irish government established the Irish-Born Child Residency Scheme, under which a 
non-national parent who had a child born in Ireland before 1 January 2005 could apply for 
residency. Applications were open for a three-month period. In total, 16,693 individuals were 
granted residency under this scheme for an initial period of two years. However, a core part of 
this bill was that parents who were allowed to remain on the basis of having an Irish-born child 
had to sign a declaration affirming that they have no entitlement to family reunification*including 
reunification in Ireland*with spouses and dependent children. This has created significant 
distress and has remained unchanged under the Immigrant, Protection and Residency Bill 
(2008). In practice, this has had the effect of separating Irish-citizen children from a second 
parent or siblings where such family members exist in another country. Furthermore, under this 
scheme, humanitarian leave to remain is granted just for the parent(s) and the Irish-born child. 
Any other children have to apply in their own right. This has resulted in unequal legal status for 
different children within the same family. These policies, which deny Irish-born children and their 
nonnational siblings some of their rights as children, are arguably a response to the threat that 
forced-migrant children pose to the ‘ideal match’ of the Irish nation-state and its politically 
structured categories of belonging. 
 
Our analysis has shown the existence of divergent discourses of children as both a product of 
and a threat to nation-state formation and maintenance. Orphans, separated children, 
unaccompanied minors, genocide survivors, or refugee children are visible mainly as a ‘product’ 
of the system of nation-states, and are treated as its victims. Adolescents, former child soldiers, 
or street youth are visible but repeatedly perceived as a ‘threat’ to national and international unity 
and belonging. As products of violence, children tend to be viewed as victims, apolitical, in need 
of protection and through the lenses of trauma. As a threat to cohesion and national unity in 
politically and ethnically divisive societies, they are deemed to be in need of re-education, 
detention or deportation. The product!threat dichotomy is neither categorical, nor fixed, nor 
permanent but, rather, contextual and relational, with children moving or being moved across its 
boundaries, and in constant tension. The existence of similar processes of inclusion and 
exclusion across different countries in the global South and North that are couched in neutral 
terms of vulnerability and protection underlie ambivalent discourses that are politically driven and 
as such need to be explicitly re-politicised. 
 
Visible and Invisible Children 
 
Another paradox of the system of nation-states is evident in those divergent discourses that 
position some children as highly visible*mainly through the lens of apolitical needs*and others as 
invisible, and that elucidate tensions in claims to nationality and belonging. Child-rights 
discourses encapsulated in international instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child oblige state parties to respect children’s rights without discrimination, irrespective of the 
child’s or his or her parents’ nationality, ethnicity or other such status and include the right from 
birth to a nationality. The predicament of stateless children exposes one of the fundamental 
inconsistencies in the ideology of the nation-state system as a whole. At the core of the system 
of nation-states is the right to citizenship and belonging. Every person belonging to a state or 
asking for asylum in another state is negotiating access to citizenship within the global system, 
relinquishing it in one state and applying for it in another. However, there are children who do not 
belong to any nation-state, and who do not have claims to citizenship anywhere*they are the 
‘stateless children’. Among them are the Bihari children in South Asia, the Bidoon in Kuwait, the 
Kurds in Syria and millions of Palestinians in the Middle East and North Africa (Frelick and Lynch 
2005; Sen 2000). These children are legally non-existent, invisible not only in relation to 
individual nation-states but also to the system as a whole. They are caught in the gaps in the 
existing nation-state system, and are outsiders not to its constituting elements*nation-states*but 
to the system per se. 
 
Changes in migration patterns, asylum and migration frameworks, and the increase in the 
number of irregular and undocumented migrants, means that ‘statelessness’ as an existential 
condition is shared by many other categories of children (Boyden and Hart 2007). In our work 
with Rwandan separated children displaced during mass movements in 1994, children informally 
fostered by Congolese families became invisible (Dona´ 2001). Not registered as Rwandans 
living abroad, the Convention rights of these children to an identity are challenged and their 
conditions unreported. In contrast to the ‘rescapee’ children mentioned earlier, who were central 
to the Rwandan post-genocide nation-building project, these separated children are invisible in 
the system of nation-states; they do not legally belong to either the Rwandan or the Congolese 
nation-state, and their entitlements for the future are unclear. 
 
Separated children who travel irregularly, those who are trafficked or are the offspring of 
undocumented migrants or asylum-seekers whose claims have been rejected are examples of 
legal invisibility. The fate of those Ireland- and UK-born children of irregular migrants and failed 
asylum-seekers is unclear, and they are faced with potential statelessness. In Ireland, there are 
no figures on the numbers of dependents or children who may have arrived with, or followed 
workers from, the accession states of Eastern Europe since May 2004. There is no onus on 
families to register them with any state bodies until they are 16 years of age, when they must 
then be registered with the Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB). This invisibility of 
immigrant children also raises questions about how this may inadvertently be supporting 
conditions that give rise to trafficking and exploitation.  
 
Many separated children are not entered in the Irish asylum process and thus are invisible in 
official asylum statistics. This may be because a social worker deems that the asylum process 
may be too traumatic for them or because of restrictive conventional definitions of ‘refugee’ to 
date, which would be inapplicable to children who may have experienced ‘private’ trauma, such 
as incest, rape and other physical abuse, or trafficking by a parent (Mooten 2006). These 
children and young people have no current legal status and no long-term protection rights, and 
may face deportation once they reach 18 years of age. Furthermore, of those separated children 
known to the authorities, more than 350 have gone missing from their care placements in recent 
years (Irish Refugee Council 2006). The Health Service Executive (HSE) has not made public 
any information about these children but there are documented cases of child trafficking which 
have never received the political or social attention merited by their potential seriousness. 
 
In the UK, Bokhari (2008) exposes the challenges facing trafficked children, including the 
shortcomings and inconsistent standards of local authorities, the lack of specialist protection and 
the uncertainty of these children’s immigration status, all of which result in the disappearance 
without trace of many children from localauthority care and in their mental-health issues going 
undetected and untreated. 
 
It is not only those children who get caught in the gaps of the system who are invisible but also 
those who sit uncomfortably in between a rhetoric of national unity and belonging and a reality of 
national and international tension. The predicament, for instance, of those Rwandan children 
whose parents are charged with involvement in the genocide, of child soldiers asking for asylum 
in European countries, and of children born of rape, are a few examples of narratives of 
invisibility due to an uneasy fit with dominant divergent discourses. 
 
Children also become invisible when they do not fit the language of needs as a child, such as 
young carers or those minors who claim refugee status on their own terms. Evidence from the 
UK suggests that separated children find it much more difficult than adults to gain asylum 
(Bhabha 2004). They have difficulty in obtaining adequate legal representation, their cases are 
more likely to be postponed and to drag over time, and they have fewer chances of being 
granted refugee status. The implicit assumption that refugees are adults means that threats 
facing children as political activists in their own right or as members of targeted families are often 
ignored or trivialised and that child-specific forms of persecution*such as child-selling or -
trafficking*are not considered to fall within the ambit of the five grounds for persecution: race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group and political opinion. Discourses of 
invisibility dominate and result in these children being ‘treated differently rather than equally’ 
(Bhabha 2004: 143). 
 
In conclusion, complementary to discourses of visibility are those of invisibility that highlight 
additional gaps and inconsistencies in the system of nation-states for those children who are 
caught outside it, those who sit uncomfortably in between contradictory political discourses or 
those who do not fit dominant perceptions of childhood. The ‘invisibility’ of certain categories of 
children exposes inconsistencies in claims to nationality and belonging. Implicit assumptions 
about social categories of ‘children’ influence which children are more likely to receive support 
and, more importantly, which children and young people are rendered invisible and untargeted. 
Some children may be privileged or marginalised as a consequence of their goodness of fit with 
political or social concepts of ‘children as citizens’ in the nation-state system. Therefore, across 
different contexts in the global South and North there are similar ambivalent discourses of 
visibility and invisibility that, although framed in terms of neutral needs, expose political 
constraints. 
 
The Psychological and the Political Child 
 
In the introduction, we pointed to the widespread tendency amongst researchers to make sense 
of children’s experiences of displacement and involuntary migration through the apolitical prism 
of psychological concepts such as trauma and mental health and psycho-social needs. In our 
attempt to re-politicise the position of forcedmigrant children, we now examine the existence of 
divergent discourses that construe the psychological and the political forced-migrant child. 
Specifically, we want to raise awareness of the fact that psychological discourses about forcibly 
uprooted children which appear apolitical on the surface, in reality function in political spheres in 
ways that can support the construction and maintenance of nation-state projects. 
 
Conversely, psychological discourse is sometimes used on behalf of or by forcedmigrant children 
to protect their needs and rights ‘as children’, and as a form of resistance in political spaces 
where they fall outside systems of national rights and entitlement (such as the asylum system) or 
are denied rights conferred by belonging and citizenship (the internally displaced). We see this 
phenomenon as a tendency to ‘psychologise the political’ and ‘politicise the psychological’. In our 
work in Rwanda, we observed the tendency to frame children’s experiences of genocide and war 
within apolitical discourses of trauma, vulnerability and psychosocial needs (Veale and Dona´ 
2002) and, in Rwanda to date, these discourses prevail (Thomson 2007). However, as time went 
by, we noticed that trauma and psychosocial interventions, framed within apparently apolitical 
care-models of assistance, in reality contributed to legitimise a political victim/perpetrator 
dichotomy that rendered invisible those children who did not fit dominant accounts of victimhood, 
and minimised the existence of fragmented relations under a post-genocide national discourse 
that focused on unity and reconciliation. 
 
The ‘psychologising’ of the genocide and its aftermath has meant that the needs and rights of 
children were primarily addressed on the basis of their perceived ‘traumatic’ and psychosocial 
vulnerability. Certain categories of children (such as survivors of the genocide and orphans) fitted 
better than other groups of children (such as those displaced immediately after and in the years 
following the genocide) within the trauma discourse and were offered more financial aid and 
support, independent of the fact that all children had been living through political violence, and 
that some of them became ‘vulnerable’ in post-genocide Rwanda because of a lack of family 
support or due to multiple displacements. In this context, the construction of the traumatised child 
came to be associated with genocide child survivors rather than with children of war. It 
contributed to validating an overt official ‘psychological’ narrative of events that distinguished 
child genocide victims from children of perpetrators and bystanders in terms of the degree of 
trauma to which they were subjected or which they inflicted, and that legitimised differential 
interventions. The apparent neutral and universal concept of trauma that contributed to the 
definition of the categories of children in need was in reality used for a Tutsidominated 
government’s political purposes to sanction an official narrative of social suffering reliant on the 
centrality of the genocide and of ‘national unity’, and which masked the existence of dissenting 
voices and different experiences of war and displacements. When viewed through the lens of the 
‘psychological’ child, forcedmigrant children are constructed as having universal yet somewhat 
apolitical identities that are consonant with constructions of the child as victim in need. 
 
In northern Uganda, psychological interventions such as psychosocial rehabilitation and 
reintegration programmes have played a key role in depoliticising former child-abductees’ 
identities from their previous role as fighters to return them to lesspowerful and arguably more-
dependent roles within civilian society. Community members described returned children and 
young people who had been through psychosocial reintegration programmes as ‘less rude’ and 
as ‘having more respect for people and elders’ (Veale and Stavrou 2007). In northern Uganda 
this programming has tended to depoliticise the position of children and call for a focus on child 
rights and welfare. However the centrality of abducted children’s experiences to the conflict 
raises an uncomfortable question*how have stories of children’s traumatic experiences 
functioned in political spaces? The roots of this conflict lie in political disenfranchisement and 
systematic, long-term, regional underdevelopment. At the height of the conflict, the response 
through the creation of ‘protected settlements’ resulted in 90 per cent of the Acholi population 
living as internally displaced. The plight of child abductees became the local and international 
symbol of the horrors of this conflict. To a large extent, economic and political discourse was put 
to one side as human rights and child protection voices dominated. The brutalisation of children 
by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) positioned the conflict (and the region) as beyond the 
bounds of rationality and this was further supported by reference to the LRA’s spiritual beliefs, 
and its branding as a ‘terrorist’ organisation. Arguably the focus on abducted children as a 
symbol of this conflict served to deflect international attention from the underlying political and 
economic roots of the conflict, the factors maintaining the conflict*such as life within the protected 
settlements*and issues of political, regional and social development. Acholi society now 
comprises an economically underdeveloped and politically alienated grouping of predominantly 
internally displaced people*all in a country that, during the 1990s, experienced one of the highest 
rates of per capita income growth in the world, with economic growth remaining consistently 
steady since then. A focus on child victimhood and need has ‘psychologised’ the political. It also 
failed to support, or advocate for any claims by, the 90 per cent of internally displaced children to 
‘equal citizenship’ and belonging within the nation-state of Uganda. 
 
In the UK, the functioning of psychological discourses in political spaces can be explored through 
a focus on social workers and counsellors who work inside detention centres to support forced-
migrant children’s wellbeing (ILPA 2004; Refugee Council 2003). Psychological interventions in 
these centres indirectly validate the existence of these centres for dealing with the management 
of migrant children, and thus position asylum-seeking children and families in detention within 
socio-political frameworks of security and criminalisation rather than of protection. Ambivalent 
psychological and political discourses of the position of children in relation to the project of 
national belonging mean that political concerns become displaced and overtly reduced to 
psychological ones while covertly fulfilling political purposes. If apparently apolitical psychological 
interventions fulfil political functions in the development and maintenance of nation-states, with 
their dichotomised assumptions of inclusion and exclusion, and constructions of the citizen and 
the alien, and the genuine and the bogus claimant, the reverse phenomenon also takes place. 
There the psychological is overtly politicised, while its political utilisation has psychological 
outcomes. In the UK, the mandatory use of dispersal for asylum-seekers without support has 
placed non-governmental organisations, advocacy groups and legal-aid agencies in the 
controversial and at times ethically difficult predicament of taking the decision to label their clients 
as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder or mental illness and to resort to the label 
‘traumatised’ to help their clients to postpone or avoid compulsory dispersal on the grounds that 
specialised mental-health facilities are not available across the country. In Ireland, mental-health 
professionals working with unaccompanied minors have utilised psychological assessments to 
make a case against the transfer of asylum-seeker minors who ‘age-out’ of the system of care for 
minors to the adult ‘direct provision’ system*a discriminatory system of meeting the basic needs 
of asylum-seekers by providing accommodation and food in designated accommodation centres 
and a stipend of 19.10 euros per week. In this instance, the construction of the traumatised 
asylum-seeking child or family serves to resist one aspect of the asylum process. The 
psychological label is overtly used for political purposes by certain categories of social actor, but 
there is a risk that this use impacts negatively on the social wellbeing of the asylum-seeking child 
and family, who are then obliged to carry the stigmatising label. Rather than pathologising them, 
there is a need to re-politicise the psychological in order to accuse the asylum system as being 
detrimental to childrens’s and families’ rights to freedom of movement and wellbeing. 
 
We thus observe a series of ambivalent or divergent discourses of the child as a political or 
psychological subject. These discourses highlight the tension between an apolitical view of 
childhood as part of a shared humanity with universal rights as ‘children’, and children as political 
entities in terms of their identity and the validity or otherwise of their claims to citizenship and 
belonging within a single nation-state and the nation-state system. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article we have offered a political analysis of the position of forced-migrant children in 
relation to the system of nation-states. Our contribution here is twofold: first, we have tried to 
move away from single-country studies and to offer an analysis of the geo-politics of child forced 
migration; secondly we have argued for the need to re-politicise child and youth migration against 
the ongoing tendency to de-politicise it within psychological models of welfare and mental health. 
Other writers have discussed the position of migrants and refugees in relation to nation-states, 
examined the relation of children to asylum policies and pointed to the increasing tension among 
existing models of welfare, migration management, child policies, and equality and discriminatory 
practices (Christie and Sidhu 2006; Giner 2007; Lane and Tribe 2006; Spicer 2008). Individual-
country analyses, as in the case of the UK, show that responses to changing patterns of 
migration and global realities are ad hoc and reactive (Giner 2007). 
 
We have spelled out the specific discourses and positions of children vis-a`-vis the nation-state 
system, and shown that underneath fragmented and context-specific responses to forced 
migration lie transnational commonalities in the way in which divergent discourses of children 
and migration are construed. We have focused on the existence of common divergent discourses 
that emerge from contexts in the global North and South*in Rwanda, Uganda, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom*where we have studied children forced to move. Our overall aim was to re-
politicise the position of forced-migrant children and young people by analysing three sets of 
divergent discourses which are manifested in current policies, laws and practices: children as a 
‘product of ’ and as a threat; visible and invisible children; and the psychological and the political 
child. 
 
In Rwanda and Uganda, ambivalent discourses relating to children who have experienced forced 
movement sit uncomfortably within national projects of development and unity; in Europe these 
discourses are directed towards newcomer children who challenge ideas of belonging. Turton 
(2002) writes that the fundamental paradox that forced migration exposes is one of ‘equal claim 
to citizenship’. These discourses show a tension between the construction of the child as ‘child’ 
(apolitical, in need, subjected to inclusive policies and welfare provisions) and of the child as 
‘migrant’. On the one hand, inclusive policies on children assert that individuals are ‘children first 
and displaced/asylum-seekers second’. They operate by asserting the neutral and apolitical 
character of childhood. Within this view, children are the subjects of welfare and child-protection 
policies, of psychosocial interventions and support. On the other hand, migration policies operate 
in the political domain, and children are classified by their political status vis-a`-vis the nation-
state (as citizen/ non-citizen, different, inferior or with unequal claims to entitlements of 
citizenship). 
 
Interventions for children deemed not to belong to or fit with the common interests of the nation-
state project often seek to contain, re-educate or expel. When the politics of childhood and those 
of migration intersect, defensive and discriminatory nation-state approaches occur. There is a 
need to re-politicise uprooted children’s positions as children and as global citizens within the 
nation-state system (rather than within individual nation-states). For children, the inconsistency is 
between the right to ‘equal claims to citizenship’ and to ‘childhood’ in politically situated contexts. 
 
The divergent discourses that we have discussed give us an insight into how uprooted children 
expose gaps, limitations and inconsistencies in the dynamics of nation-state formation, 
development and maintenance, and in the system of nationstates. Nation-states find it difficult to 
reconcile the tension between the moral right to protection without discrimination in the name of 
‘childhood’ on the one hand, and the ‘politics’ of child forced migration on the other. They 
struggle to resolve divergent views of childhood as ‘apolitical’ and therefore having a claim to fit 
within the global nation-state system without discrimination, and the fact that some children are 
explicitly (in law) or implicitly (in practice) viewed as fitting more ‘naturally’ than others within 
existing nation-states’ ideas of belonging. In other words, nation-states struggle to bring together 
inclusive child-policy frameworks that view displaced, refugee, asylum-seeking and returnee 
children as children with equal rights to global citizenship, and exclusive national or asylum 
frameworks which view certain categories of children as the ‘other’. 
 
There are two general concluding comments to our analysis. The first is that ad hoc and 
unfocused responses will continue to exist because they reflect not fundamental inconsistencies 
of individual nation-states but a fundamental tension inherent in the system of nation-state 
formation and consolidation: the matching of ideals of nation and state. As long as the nation-
state system remains as it is, the best that can be hoped for is compromise that supports the 
formation and consolidation of the coexistence of childhood with citizenship. In this respect, the 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, a ‘universally agreed set of non-negotiable 
standards and obligations’ (www.unicef.org/crc/), conveys a specific type of global narrative: 
children have rights. This positions children across the world into a specific relationship with the 
nation-state system, one in which they have rights as citizens and as children. However, there 
are discrepancies in this narrative, such as when children who are forced to migrate due to 
conflict discover that the basic principles enshrined in the Convention do not necessarily 
translate into practice for them. For example, the UK government reservation about Article 22 of 
the CRC on refugee children is an example of the tension between national and international 
narratives and expectations regarding the rights of children forced to flee. In this context, the 
CRC is an appropriate tool with which to overcome divergent perceptions, responses and 
narratives about children in relation to nation-states by incorporating two elements *citizenship 
and childhood*which are at the core of current discrepancies and inconsistencies. 
 
The second and alternative perspective is to put under scrutiny the permanent existence of the 
system of nation-states per se in its current incarnation. Christie (2003) does so when discussing 
social work practices with asylum-seeking children. The creation of social work as a profession is 
closely associated with the formation of the welfare state and nation-states. Work with asylum-
seeking children challenges social-work practice as a by-product of the nation-state and, in order 
to overcome these challenges, there is a need for social work to move towards post-national 
frames of care. A similar position is advocated by those who support open borders (i.e. Cohen 
2006) not only for capital and technology (which are already present) but also for the movement 
of people. The European Union, as one model of a regional open border, shows that the gaps 
and inconsistencies between the ideal matching of nation and state would be reduced and would 
disappear. It is unclear what this will entail in order to ensure that the rights of children as global 
citizens can be upheld. 
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